



THE LAW APPLICABLE TO THE NEGOTIATION
OF CONTRACTS BY TELEGRAPI.
I. I. The sender of a message for the purpose of initiating a contract, it would
seem should be held responsible for the correctness of the agency employed in its
transmission.
2. Those cases which dissent from this rule, sometimes adopt the same principle,
in holding the sender responsible when he employs a special operator.
3. The English courts adopt a different rule, not holding the sender bound by
the errors in transmission.
4. The telegraph is the agent for the party in interest, whoever employs it.
5. Grounds of the English decisions discussed.
6. The reasons for the rule first stated seem to preponderate.
IL At what time contracts negotiated by telegraph become complete.
1. A difference has been claimed between this and the mails, but without reason.
2. The delivery to the post-office of the acceptance of a definite offer closes the
con tract.
3. The same rule has, with reason, been applied to negotiations by telegraph.
Suggestions as to the mode of proof.
4. The reason of the thing and the decisions concur in there being no difference
in negotiating contracts by mail and by telegraph.
II. Discussion of the difference between the English and American decisions
on this topic.
1. Statement of the English rule.
2. Reasons for dissenting from it. This mode of negotiating contracts between
inerchant, their agents and factors, has become so almost universal, both at home
and abroad, that it becomes more and more important, to have precise and defti-
nite notions in regard to the law applicable to such transactions.
IV. The right to countermand by telegraph offers and acceptances sent by mail.
I. The first and perhaps the most difficult question will be to
determine which party is responsible, as between the contracting
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parties, for any errors which may occur in the transmission of the
correspondence.
1. The early doctrine maintained in this country was, that the
party initiating the negotiation was responsible for the correct
transmission of his message, whether an offer or inquiry, and that
he was bound by it, in the terms in which it was delivered to the
party addressed: Durkee v. Vrermont Central Py., 29 Vt. Rep.
127. But the doctrine of this case has not been universally fol-
lowed, either in this country or in England.
2. But some of the cases seem to have adopted the same princi-
ple in another form. Thus in Dunning v. Roberts, 35 Barb.
463, it was held, that if one employ a special agent to transmit
the message across the wires, and who was not the regular operator,
he will be responsible for the correctness of the transmission. We
cannot comprehend how this case differs, in its essential principle,
from one where the message is sent by the regular operator. It will
not indeed render the telegraph company responsible for the default,
where a special operator is employed by the sender. But it would
seem that the sender by the ordinary mode would assume the
same responsibility to the party addressed, as to the correctness
of the dispatch, upon its arrival at the point of destination. The
only ground upon which the sender will be bound, in either case,
is that it was transmitted by his own agent, and that he should be
held responsible for the defects, either of capacity or conduct of the
agent, while in his employ. This is certainly the general rule in
regard to agency. The rule would be the same, as it seems to us,
Whether the party had sent the message by telegraph or by private
messenger, or by an express agent, so long as it was capable of
being erroneously delivered, as it would be, in either case supposed,
if not to be delivered in the same writing made by the sender, as it
is, when sent by mail, where there is no chance for any mistake
in transmitting, the very same message first made being sent, pro-
vided it is delivered at all. But in the case of messages sent by
telegraph, or by private or public express, when not reduced, in
the two latter cases, to -writing by the sender, mistakes may occur,
and if they do, through the fault of the agencies employed by the
sender, is he responsible to the other party for such mistake?
For if so, he should be bound by the message in the form of its
actual delivery.
3. But the English and some of the American courts perhaps,
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have actually decided, that such is not the fact, in regard to mes-
sages sent by telegraph. In Henkel v. Pape, L. R. 6 Exch. 7, the
defendant wrote a message for the telegraph company to trans-
mit to the plaintiff, for three rifles. There had been some former
negotiation between the parties for the purchase of fifty rifles.
The message being sent foi the rifles, the plaintiff naturally under-
stood it had reference to the former negotiation, and sent fifty
rifles, which the defendant refused to accept. The plaintiff brought
suit for the fifty, but the court held he could only recover for the
three, as directed in the defendant's written message. And it
has also been held by the English courts, that the plaintiff in such
case would have no redress against the telegraph company, on
the ground of want of privity, not having employed them himself:
iPlayford v. United K ingdom Electric Tel. Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. 706.1
4. The case of New York & Washington Printing Tel. Co. v.
Dryburg, 35 Penn. St. 298, recognises the right of the party to
whom the message is sent, to maintain an action against the com-
pany sending it, for any damage he may have sustained by an
error in the transmission, notwithstanding he had, personally, no
communication with the company until the message reached him.
This case may be said, incidentally, to recognise the rule, that the
party sending the message on his own account, is not respon-
sible for the conduct of the telegraph in the transmission ; but the
I If both these cases are sound, the result will be, that the only party injured
will have no redress. But the old rule in England certainly was, and the present
rule here unquestionably is, that in contracts made with public companies, serving
all who bring work for them, like carriers and telegraph companies, the under-
taking on their part is presumed to be in favor of the party interested, by whos-
ever agency it was negotiated. Thus if the consignor is responsible for the trans-
portation and delivery of the goods, he alone can maintain an action for loss or
damage during the transit: Hooper v. Chicago 6- N. JV. Rg., 27 Wisc. 81. But
if the goods vest in the consignee, upon delivery to the carrier, he must sue :
Dution v. Solomonson, 3 B. & 1'. 582; Jacobs v. Nelson, 3 Taunt. 423. The party,
in fact negotiating the contract, acts on his own behalf, so far as lie is interested,
and on behalf of others, who may become interested beyond the extent of his
own interest. And there is no rule of law better settled than that, when a con-
tract, resting in parol, is made by an agent, even where the principal is not dis-
closed, the action for breach may be brought, either in the name of the prin-
cipal or the agent, the right d-F'et-off, on the part of the debtor, being preserved,
the same against the principal as if the action were brought in the name of the
agent: I Chitt. Pi. 134; Story on Agency, 403, p. 479, cd. 7; Sadler v. Leigh,
4 Camp. 195; Lapham v. Green, 9 Vt. 407; Palerson v. Gandaseqni, 15 East 62.
Lord DENMAN, C. J., in Sims v. Bond, 5 B. & Ad. 389 ; N. Y. 6- JV. Pr. Tel.
Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Penn. St. 298, citing Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. Raym. 646.
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case assumes no such ground, but rather the contrary, that the
party may seek his remedy, either against the sender, or the com-
pany guilty of default in transmitting it. For as the order was
for two hand-bouquets, upon a florist, and was sent for two htundred
bouquets, the operator reading "hand" Itund, and supposing it an
abbreviation for "hundred," the defendant would have been bene-
fited by the error, if he chose to hold the sender upon the message,
as it reached him, thus obtaining a larger order. But he elected
to pursue the real defaulter. "
5. We need not, perhaps, further discuss the ground upon which,
probably, the preponderance of authority seems to hold the sender of
the message not responsible for the errors in transmission. We can
conceive no plausible ground upon which that view is maintainable,
unless it be that the telegraph company being, at most, a special
agent, employed and authorized only to act on behalf of the
sender of the message, to the extent of sending the very message
delivered to their operator, he is not bound by any act of the agent,
beyond his authority or employment. That rule is most unques-
tionable, within proper limits ; but it does not seem to us entirely
satisfactory, when applied strictly and literally to this subject.
For in the employment of a special agent of any kind, for the
transmission of an order upon a mercantile house or upon any one,
there can be no fair question, the principal is bound to take all
reasonable precautions to employ a competent agent and to have
him properly instructed. And in regard to the transmission of
telegraphic messages, there is nothing clearer than that the sender,
by taking proper precautions, may insure the entire accuracy of the
transmission. This will be done (1) by securing a proper operator,
and either reading the message to him, or else writing it so plainly
that he cannot fail to send it correctly, by which correct trans-
mission will be rendered almost certain; or (2) if absolute certainty
is desired, it may be secured by having the message repeated back,
while the sender remains in the office to test its accuracy, or, if
that be too dilatory, by having the message repeated back to the
operator, having first secured the correct reading of the original
message by the operator.' All the cases, so far as we know, where
I It is sometimes said that absolute exemption from error will be secured by
having the message repeated back to the operator. But this will be true only to
the extent that the operator understands the message rightly himself. In the case
just cited, if the operator understood "hand" to mean hundred, repeating the
message would not correct the error.
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errors have occurred in the transmission of messages, on behalf of
the sender, and for which he was not held responsible, turned upon
mistakes which would probably not have occurred if the sender had
taken the proper precautions, even short of having the messages re-
peated, and clearly not with that. We cannot therefore say, that
we feel prepared to' abandon the ground maintained by us in Dur-
kee v. Railway, supra. The case seems to us different, where a
public agency is employed, from that where one sends a special
messenger. It has been so held, in regard to the employment of
known factors or brokers, where it is held that such known public
agents are, as to the persons with whom they do business, for any
principal, clothed with the authority of general agents, although
only employed for a single time, and under special instructions,
limiting their powers as between them and the employer: Story on
Agency, § 131 ; Fenn v. Htarrison, 3 Term R. 757, 762; s. c. 4
Id. 177; Whitehead v. Tuckett, 15 East 408; Pickering v. Busk,
Id. 38, 43; Daniel v. Adams, Ambler 495, 498; Johnson v.
Jones, 4 Barb. 369. So also where there is no other mode of
communicating except by some public instrumentality, like the
post-office or telegraph companies, whatever risks or uncertainties
exist, in suchagencies, must fall upon the party employing them,
and who is responsible, in a general way, for the transmission of
the message, whatever it may be. Thus where money is sent
by mail by a debtor to meet his obligation, without any special or
reasonably implied direction on the part of the creditor, the sender
assumes the risk of the transmission. But if the creditor direct
the transmission in this mode, he must assume the risk, and in
either case the servants employed in the post-office, or in the trans-
portation of the mail, through whose culpable neglect any loss
occurs, will be responsible to the party at whose risk the message
or parcel is sent, although the post-master general, as general
superintendent of the office, cannot be held responsible for the
default of any such his public agents: Lane v. Cotton, supra ;
Yhitfield v. Le Despencer, 2 Cowp. 754. So, too, upon the same
principle, the deputy post-masters are responsible only for letters
lost through their own want of ordinary care, and not for the
misconduct of their seritas, but the servants are responsible for
their own misconduct to the party injured thereby: Rownir?,g v.
aoodehild, 3 Wilson 443 ; Stock v. Harris, 5 Burrow 2709; Dan-
forth v. Grant, 14 Vt. 283; Story on Agency, § 319 a.
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6. And it seems to us, that the same rules will apply to com-
munication by telegraph, with the exception that the company is
responsible for the default of its servants. But as to the respon-
sibility, in the first instance, and as between contracting parties,
the party for whose benefit the message is sent will asume the
ri k oF correct transmission, having his remedy over against the
company when in default. This view seems to us so just and rea-
"'s,,a1ble, and the arguments against it of so comparatively little
weight, that we cannot, at present, believe it will not ultimately
prevail everywhere.
I. We are now briefly to consider at what point a contract
negotiated by telegraph is consummated.
1. There have been some intimations from judges, in the way
of obiter dicta, that there may exist some difference in this respect,
between the negotiation of contracts by correspondence through
the post-office and by telegraph: WILLES, J., in Godwin v.
Francis,.L. R. 5 0. P. 295. But we have not been able to com-
prehend why it should be so, if the courts put the proper con-
struction upon telegraphic communications.
2. It is now entirely well settled, we believe, that in negotiating
contracts by correspondence through the mail, the final acceptance
on one side of a definite proposition on the other, consummates the
negotiation, at the time of the delivery of such acceptance, at the
post-office. This rule is firmly and learnedly maintained by Mr.
Justice MA'CY, in delivering the opinion of the Court of Errors in
New York, in .Mlactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103,1 and has since been
followed in that state: Brisban v. Boyd, 4 Paige 17.
3. And Trevor v. Wood, 36 N. Y. 307,2 applies the same rule to
contracts negotiated by telegraph. And it is here declared that
such acceptance by telegraph is at the risk of the party whose pro-
position is thus accepted, whether it arrives in due course of the
telegraph, correctly or incorrectly, or not at all. Thus it would
seem to follow that, in proving such proposition and acceptance, the
telegram of the party making the proposition, as delivered'to the
other party, will be the original, and if that cannot be produced,
the next best evidence will be the copy recorded in the books of
the company where it was received, which in strictness should be
I The acceptance must be in reasonable time and before the receipt of any coun-
termand : Abbott v. Shepard, 48 N: 1H. 14; Stockharn v. Stockham, 32 Md. 196.
2 See also Brown v. Railway, 44 N. Y. 79.
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verified by the clerk enrolling it. And the original of the accept-
ance will be the written telegram delivered at the office .of the com-
pany, where it will naturally be preserved, or if not; its enrolment
will be preserved. These propositions are also maintained in
Durkee v. The Railway, supra. This is in accordance with the
more recent English decisions, in regard to the negotiation of con-
tracts by the mail: Dunlop v. Higgins, 1 Ho. Lds. Cas. 381.
4. The attempt to qualify this rule to the extent that the
acceptance must ultimately be received by the party making the
offer, in order to perfect the contract, in Briti8h and American
Tel. Co. v. Colson, L. R. 6 Exch. 108, is severely condemned by
the Lords Justices, in Harris's Case, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 587, and
must, we think, fail to be recognised in the final court of appeal.
For if the acceptance is at the risk of the party making the first
offer, after its delivery either to the post-office or the telegraph, as
to its transmission correctly, it must equally be so, as to the time
of its reaching its destination, whether in proper time, or not at
all. It seems very obvious that, upon principle, no such qualifi-
,:cation can'be maintained as that attempted in B. & A. Tel. Co.
v. Colson, supra. The foregoing propositions seem to us most
unquestionably established by the latest and most approved au-
thorities, and they certainly afford no ground for any distinction
between negotiating contracts by, mail and by telegraph.'
I There are many cases in the English reports, referred to by the Lords Jus-
tices, in their opinions in H arris's Case, supra, which have an important bearing
upon the question how far an acceptance of a proposition, made by the other ne-
gotiating party, and delivered at the post-office or the telegraph, will fail of con-
summating the contract, where it finally fails ever to reach the party for wlom it
is intended. The cases prior to British . Am. Tel. Co. v. Colson, supra, all hold,
that the delivery, of the acceptance to the mail or the telegraph, by whichever the
proposition was received, will consummate the contract, without regard to the
question of its ultimately reaching the party for whom it was intended. That is
the doctrine of Hebbs's Case, Law Rep. 4 Eq. 9 ; Adams v. Lindsell, I B. & AM.
681. It is true this case also contained the point that the offer was posted to a
wrong address, :by which it failed to reach the other party until two days later than
it otherwise would have done, whereby the acceptance, which was mailed imme-
diately the offer was received, failed to reach the party offering the goods, until
he had otherwise disposed of them. But as this was through the fault of the party
making the offer it was held he could not complain of the delay, thus favoring
the rule before stated, that the-Farty making the first offer is responsible for its
reaching the other party in due time and correct form. Lord COTTENIAM, in the
House of Lords, in Dunlop v. H qgias, supra, likened the acceptance of an offer
through the mail to sending notice of the dishonor of a bill or note, where it had
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III. We have thus presented the important discrepancy between
the English doctrine and what we regard as the prevailing doc-
trine in this country, both (1) as to the responsibility of the
parties to a contract negotiated by telegraph for the errors of the
latter; and also (2) the allowable remedies against the telegraph
owners. We desire, by some further illustrations of our meaning,
to render ourselves, if possible, more clearly understood, and thus
present, in a clearer light, what we regard as a departure, both
from principle and analogy, in the English decisions.
1. There can be nothing, in our apprehension, more unreasona-
ble or unjust, and, at the same time, a more entire departure from,
both principle and analogy, than the point understood to be
declared in Playford v. United Kingdom Electric Tel. Co., L. R.
4 Q. B. 706. In that case the plaintiff, having a cargo of ice, invited
an offer from a dealer in the article by telegraph, he being, by the
custom of the trade, bound to pay the expense of the return mes-
sage in the event of it being accepted. The offer being twenty-
three shillings, was, by an error in reading, transmitted as twenty-
seven shillings, whereupon the plaintiff sent his cargo of ice, and the
party making the offer, refused to accept it except at twenty-three
shillings, his real offer, as delivered to the telegraph. The plaintiff
thereby lost 391. Is. 6d., and brought his action against the
telegraph company to recover the same. The American cases
were cited, showing that here the courts recognise the analogy
between the public duties of common carriers and telegraph compa-
nies, and allow the party really injured by the default of the
been held sufficient to deliver the notice at the post-office, whether it ever reached
the endorser or not, as held in Stocken v. Collin, 7 M. & W. 515, and other cases.
And Duncan v. '71phum, 8 C. B. 225, seems to favor the doctrine, that if the ac-
ceptance of a proposition is lost by the post-office it will not render the acceptance
any the less effective, as a consummation of the contract. If the acceptance is
clearly conditional it will not become effective as a consummation of the contract
until the assent of the other party to the condition is properly signified to the
party making the condition, which must be done in the same mode in which the
original acceptance should be made, i. e. by delivering it to the post-office, or the
telegraph, by whichever mode the parties arc negotiating the contract. It has
been held that the acceptance of an offer will be construed as absolute and com-
plete in effecting the consummation of the contract, unless it contained some
clearly expressed and peremptory condition or qualification : E-nglish and Foreign
Credit Co. v. Ardain, Law Rep. 5 H. of L. 64. Potter v. Saunders, 6 Hare I,
seems also to be opposed to the rule first broached in British 4- Anterican Tel. Co. v.
Colson, Law Rep. 6 Exch. 108.
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latter companies to maintain an action to recover damages: .De
Butte v. N. Y., Albany &' Buff. Tel. Co., 1 Daly 547 ; N. Y. g"
WV. . Tel. Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Penn. St. 298. The learned
judge said in giving judgment: "We cannot agree with the judg-
ments given in the American courts, cited in argument, that there
is any analogy between a consignment of goods through a carrier
and the transmission of a telegram." The learned judge also
denies, that "the person, to whom a telegraphic message is sent,
can be said to have a property in the message." *" * "The only
question therefore is, with whom was the contract made ?" Here
he concludes it was solely with the party sending the reply, and
he alone can sue, since he alone employed the telegraph com-
pany.
2. It scarcely expresses what we feel in regard to such a rule
of law, to say that it is incomprehensible to us. We think we do
comprehend enough of it to understand, that it is not only a
'departure from all just analogies, as well in the law of agency, as
in that of carriers ; and that, in practice, it must prove, not only
inconvenient and embarrassing, but that it will, in many cases,
produce serious injustice. We feel more keenly, an error in the
English decision, because of its greater influence upon our own law,
and also because of its far more rare occurrence, than among our
own multiplied courts, many of which have by no means the same
opportunity to know the just and salutary application of the prin-
ciples of the common law, as are possessed by the English courts.
We do not suppose the English courts would adhere to the form
of the contract so implicitly, as to require a known agent, transmit-
ting a message on behalf of his principal, as in the case of a
commercial traveller directing his principal to fill an order for
goods bargained by himself, to sue for any default in the transmis-
sion, in his own name, merely because the agent gave the order.
But it seems to us, that this simple rule of the law of agency, qui
facit per aliumfacit per se, reaches all the difficulty which ever
arises, in regard to the party entitled to sue for the defaults of
telegraph companies in transmitting messages. The party direct-
ing the message acts on behalf of the party really interested in
the correct transmission-of-,the same, and that party may always
sue for any breach of duty. We cannot bring ourselves to believe
that the English courts will, ultimately, adhere, so strenuously
to what we cannot but regard as the mere shadow of the con-
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tract, as to exclude the only party in interest from all redress,
and thus exempt the real defaulting party from all responsibility.
IV. There are, of course, very many other points where the
use of the telegraph will modify, to some extent, the established
rules of law affecting the negotiation of contracts through the
mail. One of these is the extent to which the action of the
parties, through the mail, will be subject to countermand before
the message through the mail reaches the other party. Upon
principle, it would seem, that an offer through the mail would be
counterma,,dable, during its transit, by any mode of communication
which reached the party before the offer. It was so held in Bank
qt the Republic v. Baxter, 31 Vermont 101. But, upon the
same principle, i. e. that action through the mail is countermand-
able. so long as it remains merely inchoate, and has not become
finally binding upon the party taking such action, it must follow,
that an acceptance through the mail, as it becomes operative from
the time of delivery to the post-office, is not countermandable by*
telegraph. This is so stated by Lord Justice MELLISH in Harr8'
Case, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 587, 595. His lordship said, that he
had always so understood the law until the ease of British and
American Tel. Co. v. Colson, L. R. 6 Exch. 108, " which had
raised some doubt on the subject." But we can scarcely suppose
that that case will effect any change in the law upon the question.'
1. F. R.
1 We have not deemed it essential to cite all the"cases in the books upon points
where there is no controversy, and we have not alluded to a class of cases, like
Datton v. Poole, I Ld. Raym. 301 ; Afellen v. Wlipple, I Gray 317, as modified
by Price v. Eaton, 4 B. & Ad. 433; Tweddle v. Atkinson, I B. & S. 393, and
many others, where it has been held, that one not a party to the contract, and
from whom the consideration did not proceed, cannot sue upon it, to enforce a
duty created for his benefit, save in exceptional cases, which were stated by Mr.
Justice METCALF, in Mellen v. Wldpple, supra, and in his Law of Contracts, n.
209, because we do not regard these cases as having any bearing upon the ques-
tion of allowing the party interested in the correct transmission of a telegram to
sue for damage sustained by the default in its transmission. That is a question
of privity, where there is serious conflict in the cases, and room for doubt how far
the later decisions have improved upon the earlier ones, which gave a more liberal
construction to the right of action, but the question we have discussed is one of
agency merely, whether a party can claim the benefit of a contract made for his
benefit by an agent not declaring his agency at the time.
